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Abstract—There is increased interest in smart vehicles acting
as both data consumers and producers in smart cities. Vehicles
can use smart city data for decision-making, such as dynamic
routing based on traffic conditions. Moreover, the multitude of
embedded sensors in vehicles can collectively produce a rich
data set of the urban landscape that can be used to provide
a range of services. Key to the success of this vision is a
scalable and private architecture for trusted data sharing. This
paper proposes a framework called SpeedyChain, that leverages
blockchain technology to allow smart vehicles to share their
data while maintaining privacy, integrity, resilience and non-
repudiation in a decentralized, and tamper-resistant manner.
Differently from traditional blockchain usage (e.g., Bitcoin and
Ethereum), the proposed framework uses a blockchain design
that decouples the data stored in the transactions from the block
header, thus allowing for fast addition of data to the blocks.
Furthermore, an expiration time for each block to avoid large
sized blocks is proposed. This paper also presents an evaluation
of the proposed framework in a network emulator to demonstrate
its benefits.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Data Decouple, Appendable Block,
Smart Vehicles, Smart Cities
I. INTRODUCTION
A smart city incorporates information and communication
technology to enhance the quality of life of its citizens and
improve the efficiency of urban services such as utilities,
energy, and transportation. Intelligent Transportation Systems
(ITS) are an integral part of smart cities. ITS use sensing,
communication, analytics, and control to improve the safety
and efficiency of city-wide transportation systems. Future con-
nected vehicles interacting will be equipped with a substantial
number of sensors (such as Global Positioning System (GPS),
dashboard cameras, Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR),
etc.) that will produce large volumes of data. Research con-
ducted by Intel predicts that future vehicles will produce 4,000
GB of data every day [1]. The data produced by smart vehicles
will be used by smart urban infrastructures to offer services,
e.g., finding available parking spots [2] or helping in a traffic
The first and second authors have the same contribution for the present
research.
incident [3]. Thus, it is crucial to ensure the validity of the
data, i.e., to ensure that the data are produced by a trusted
vehicle.
The significant volume of data produced by the vehicles,
as well as the requirement to trust the data producer raises
the demand for a low-latency trusted data exchange platform.
In such a framework, participants in a smart city, including
vehicles, roadside infrastructure units (RSIs), and service
providers (SPs), must be able to validate the veracity of
the information they receive, i.e., ensure that the data are
produced by a legitimate entity and that these data have not
been altered. Furthermore, the validation must be performed
with low latency given the high volume of data and the real-
time nature of some services (e.g., traffic updates or accident
reports).
The exchanged data between vehicles may contain privacy-
sensitive information about the vehicle owner, e.g., the location
of the vehicle. If the identity of the vehicle owner is revealed
to third parties such as SPs, then this could be construed
as a serious breach of personal privacy. Hence, any smart
city platform must guarantee that privacy is provided as a
fundamental requirement.
Existing methods to achieve data integrity and verac-
ity [4], [5] suffer from the following issues:
• Centralization: most of the existing methods rely on
centralized brokers, such as the vehicle manufacturer,
and are unlikely to scale and accommodate millions of
connected vehicles, each of which generating a large
amount of sensing data [5].
• Lack of Privacy: the existing data exchange platforms
require a vehicle to authenticate itself to ensure trust. This
compromises the vehicle owner privacy as the exchanged
data is now connected to their identity [6], [7].
• Data Vulnerability: data collected by connected vehi-
cles is typically stored in traditional data stores (e.g., cen-
tralized Database Management Systems) [5], which have
been shown to be vulnerable to breaches [8]. Tampering
with these data could lead to serious harm, e.g, causing
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accidents if the falsified data are used to control traffic
lights.
Blockchain [9] is a promising new technology that has the
potential to address the aforementioned challenges. It supports
decentralization, security, and privacy and is being widely used
in diverse disciplines including finance, law, Internet of Things
(IoT) and energy [10]. Blockchain maintains a distributed
ledger of blocks that are shared across all participating nodes.
Each transaction, i.e., data exchange between nodes, is verified
by all, or some, participating nodes, thus eliminating the need
for central authorities. Transactions are grouped in blocks and
then appended to the blockchain. Appending a new block to
the blockchain, known as mining, entails solving a puzzle
or even voting in order to achieve a consensus among the
nodes of the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network that distributively
manages the blockchain. This puzzle underpins a trustless
consensus algorithm among untrusted nodes. Sensible data
transferred between nodes can be encrypted, which protects
against eavesdropping. In order to ensure the user privacy,
the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [11], for example, is based on a
nonexistence of public association between Public Key (PK)
and its owner (person).
This paper proposes a blockchain-based data exchange
framework for smart cities called SpeedyChain. SpeedyChain
includes smart city infrastructure (e.g., traffic lights), smart
vehicles, RSIs, and SPs as shown in Figure 1. The blockchain
management, i.e., verification of transactions and blocks, and
mining new blocks, are performed by participants that have
both more available resources and a closer commitment to the
smart city, e.g., RSIs and SPs.
RSI 
Smart 
Vehicles 
BC	
RSI 
RSI 
SP 
SP 
SP SP 
BC	 BC	
Fig. 1. Smart city scenario.
The most prevalent blockchain implementation, Bitcoin,
demands high storage capacity as well as processing power to
run the consensus algorithm called Proof-of-Work (PoW) [11].
This algorithm rewards the nodes based on their processing
power. Other blockchain solutions focusing on IoT devices
such as IOTA [12] rely on simplified versions of the PoW
algorithm. Additionally, these traditional blockchains have a
high latency when including a new transaction, which is not
well suited for the smart city scenario as outlined earlier. In
a previous work, Lunardi et al. [13] proposed a customized
blockchain that relies upon a single block per device identified
by its public key and storing signed transactions to address
these limitations. This blockchain allows appending data to an
existing block through the hash of the previous information
and signing the new created information. Moreover, since
a new transaction can be instantaneously added to a block,
it does not suffer from the latency issues associated with
the formation of a block by collating pending transactions.
However, it does not support privacy and mobility aspects that
are desired for smart cities.
By using SpeedyChain, the participants in the blockchain
can establish communication with non-repudiation, data in-
tegrity and resilience, which not only allows a vehicle to
be authenticated by RSIs but also allows RSIs to be trusted
by vehicles. Once the trust is established, the vehicle will
have a block created on the blockchain and is allowed to
append transactions to his block. To ensure user privacy, our
framework proposal relies on the anonymity principle that is
used in Bitcoin, thus vehicles must change their keys in defined
time intervals known as key update interval (KUI). Within a
KUI, vehicles must replace their current key pair by a new
one and update the blockchain accordingly.
The main contribution of this paper is SpeedyChain, a per-
missioned blockchain-based framework for ensuring resilient,
decentralized and immutable management of smart city data.
SpeedyChain also ensures reliable Vehicle-to-Infrastructure
communication and maintains vehicle privacy by employing
periodically changeable keys. Therefore, important changes
were incorporated in existing blockchain based-solutions for
a similar IoT scenario, especially related to the definition of
expiration time of a block (that can be used to avoid large
sized blocks), the inclusion of the access level for devices
(that can help to manage permissions of each vehicle) and
the adoption of key update algorithm (that can reduce the
traceability of the vehicle data). Also, we undertake extensive
experiments to evaluate the performance of SpeedyChain in
an emulation environment using Common Open Research
Emulator (CORE) [14]. For example, we varied the number
of created transactions between 10 and 1,000 and measured
the time required to validate and append a new transaction
in the blockchain. In our experimental results, we observed a
linear growth in time and were able to show the low latency
introduced by our framework (i.e., under 2 milliseconds). Con-
sequently, the results demonstrate that through SpeedyChain
usage, it is possible to exchange information in smart cities
ensuring resilience, data integrity and tamper-resistance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents an overview of research related to smart cities and
blockchain applications. Section III presents a synopsis of
the underlying blockchain technology that we have used
and the changes incorporated to make it applicable to the
smart city scenario. Section IV provides the details of our
proposed blockchain-based data exchange framework. A brief
discussion of security and extensive evaluations are presented
in Section V. Finally, we draw some conclusions in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In most smart city scenarios, Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tems (ITS) are mostly used to provide connected vehicles with
information about the current traffic situation as well as about
road and weather conditions. Furthermore, ITS enable/support
beneficial functions such as path planning or mechanisms to
warn road users about traffic jams, approaching emergency
vehicles, and dangerous roadworks. To do so, vehicles and
roadside infrastructure units (RSIs), such as traffic lights,
need to exchange data using Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)
communication. One key issue in such ITS applications is the
privacy of the involved users [15]. This privacy is defined as
the capability of keeping users data anonymous such that they
cannot be linked to their real identity.
To tackle this issue, researchers have proposed solutions
[15]–[18] for classical ITS functions, which mitigate most of
the known privacy issues. However, the discussed solutions do
not tackle the challenges of future smart cities, like supporting
a decentralized trust model where multiple entities (SPs, RSIs,
and vehicles) act together to share information.
In order to identify the privacy issues related to smart
vehicles, Bloom et al. [6] focus on people’s perception about
the data collected by self-driving cars. They conducted a study
with 302 participants and showed that people are not aware of
the extensive amount of data collected by these cars including
GPS data, images, speed and how these data are shared and
used. Once the participants were made aware of this fact, they
expressed concerns about how the data could be manipulated
or who could have access to that data. Their findings suggested
that the associated privacy concerns could have a negative
impact on the acceptance of autonomous driving vehicles.
Privacy in smart cities and vehicular networks is an issue
discussed in several works [19]–[22]. Papadimitratos [19], for
example, proposed an architecture that relies on a certification
authority (CA) that is responsible for the identity management
in its own region (like city, district, county, etc.). Thus, each
region or city has its own CA, and region-to-region cross-
certification is used to allow a vehicle to move from one
CA to another. The centralization of the CA is a bottleneck
and a single point of failure, which motivates the need for
a decentralized solution. To address the privacy issue, the
authors proposed the creation of a pool of pseudonyms that
are assigned to vehicles when they move between regions.
Blockchain technology provides a decentralized and re-
silient solution through a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, and
ensures data integrity by employing a hash of the data stored
in the blockchain. Li et al. [25] proposed a framework that
relies on a blockchain and a cryptocurrency, called CreditCoin,
in order to motivate users to share information. However, the
network latency to produce information and to notify the RSI
is not evaluated.
Sharma et al. [24] defined a blockchain-based architecture
that relies on a vehicle manufacturer or a transit department
to issue and to revoke permissions for all vehicles. Vehicles
act as regular nodes that produce information that is stored in
the blockchain, and special miner nodes that are managed by
the manufacturer/road transport authority are responsible for
handling all requests/responses from regular nodes. The miner
is the node responsible for creating new blocks containing the
vehicles transactions and updating the peers.
Dorri et al. [23] proposed a blockchain-based framework to
address security and privacy of smart vehicles. In their paper,
they discuss multiple use cases including remote software
updates and flexible automotive insurance schemes. However,
their article does not provide a detailed technical discussion
of their framework and neither do they propose solutions for
addressing the issues that we focus on in this paper.
Lunardi et al. [13] proposed a lightweight blockchain that
is responsible for keeping the data produced in a smart home
scenario. Their paper considers that each device in a smart
home will produce information, and this data will be stored
as a transaction in the device’s block, thus each device has only
one block attached to the blockchain. In their architecture, the
blockchain is maintained in the gateways (which are devices
with more resources than sensor/actuator devices) and each
block can grow without any limit.
Table I provides a comparative summary of the key aspects
of relevant related works. As previously described, IOTA [12]
is a blockchain proposed to perform Machine-to-Machine
(M2M) payments using IoT devices, however it uses Proof-of-
Work (PoW) consensus, which requires a considerable time to
append new information. Consequently, hardware requirement
for a full node in IOTA is high and not compatible with
IoT devices (e.g., a PC with at least 2GB of memory is
recommended). Focusing in limited hardware, Dorri et al. [9],
[23] and Lunardi et al. [13] proposed blockchain-based solu-
tions that achieve low latency for adding information to the
blockchain, however, both proposals do not take into account
the dynamism and privacy concerns that are important in
smart city scenarios. While Li et al. [25] and Sharma et
al. [24] presented solutions using blockchain for smart cities,
their approach incurs long delays for adding and retrieving
information to and from the blockchain.
III. BLOCKCHAIN ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we discuss the fundamental concepts of
blockchain architecture that underpins our framework. The
most prevalent blockchain implementations (e.g., Bitcoin and
Ethereum) are not suitable for SpeedyChain as they demand
a lot of resources (computation and bandwidth), while in a
smart city scenario some of the entities (e.g.: traffic lights
and parking spots) are resource constrained. Additionally,
some applications, such as vehicular networks, require low
latency to information exchange. Furthermore, conventional
blockchains require from a few seconds up to minutes to insert
new information into their distributed ledger (depending on
the used consensus algorithm). In a previous work, Lunardi
et al. [13] presented a lightweight permissioned blockchain
that creates blocks on demand. Therefore, each device will
produce information and append data blocks to its own block.
Consequently, devices will not have to wait for other devices
TABLE I
RELATED WORK ASPECTS COMPARISON
IOTA [12] Dorri et al. [9], [23] Lunardi et al. [13] Sharma et al. [24] Li et al. [25] SpeedyChain
Time to add
transaction Minutes ms to seconds >40 ms N/A >40 ms <2 ms
Architecture P2P Overlays Gateways Vehicles andMiner Nodes RSU/OBU RSI - Vehicles
Hardware Node: PC; Wallet:Own/Rasp.Pi N/A
Arduino, Orange Pi
and Raspberry Pi N/A Simulated Emulated
Block Immutable Immutable Decoupled Immutable Immutable Decoupled
Main Usage Payment M2M Smart Homes /Smart Cities
Smart Homes /
Smart Offices Smart Cities Smart Cities Smart Cities
Key
Management
One key pair
per device
One key pair
per device
One key pair
per device
One key pair
per node
One key pair
per node
Expiration date
for each PubKey.
Only one
PubKey active.
to append its information into blockchain. Also, gateways are
able to maintain only the Block Header - which contains
the most important information about devices (especially their
public keys). It relies on signing the generated information and
storing it in transactions that are attached to a block header.
Each block contains two main parts as shown in Figure 2.
Here, we modify that approach to fit a smart city scenarios as
follows:
• Block Header: the header is the only part of the block
that is hashed and used in the header of the next block.
This operation creates the link between the blocks in
the blockchain. Thus, it should contain the necessary
information to identify and verify that the transactions
were produced only by the device that is the public key
owner. We introduce an expiration field that defines for
how long (deadline) a block can accept new transactions.
Therefore, this change prevents a block from growing in
size indefinitely. In the solution proposed by [13], a block
could accept new transactions at any time.
• Block Ledger: the payload contains the transactions that
are chained to the block header. Unlike conventional
blockchains where all transactions of the same node
are chained together and might be in different blocks,
SpeedyChain chains all valid transactions of the same
node to the same block header, as shown in Figure 2.
As the link between the transactions is based on the
block header, the transaction can be stored elsewhere, to
avoid consuming space on the RSI, while making device-
specific queries faster. Moreover, the inclusion of new
information in each block could be performed in parallel.
• Sensor Data Support: in order to support the inclusion
of smart city data, the structure of adopted blockchain
transactions was adapted to support data produced by the
sensors of the vehicles (which could be speed, tempera-
ture, etc.). Similarly, we added fields to insert a geotag
(GPS position where the data were produced), an access
level definition to describe the type of information stored
in the transaction and the information about which user
has permission to access the information.
Mining a block into the blockchain involves running a con-
sensus algorithm that is a hard-to-solve easy-to-verify puzzle
to protect the blockchain against malicious miners attempting
to flood the blockchain with blocks. However, conventional
consensus algorithms, e.g., PoW and Proof-of-Stake (PoS),
incur significant (processing and memory) overheads, which
are beyond the capabilities of IoT devices. To address this
challenge, Lunardi et al. [13] designated gateway nodes that
are responsible for validating transactions and maintaining
the blockchain. Besides gateway nodes, device nodes are
responsible for gathering information from the environment,
creating transactions with this information and sending them
to the gateways. SpeedyChain works in a permissioned way
using. It uses the structure as shown in Figure 2, where, each
block is created only after the RSI receives a witness (an
entity that will ensure that the block was created by a genuine
vehicle) validation, which means that it is guaranteed that the
vehicle physically exists in the claimed area.
Figure 3 presents the device data generation process, based
on [13], and adapted for the smart city scenario. Each device
is responsible for retrieving data from the environment (Step
1), signing the generated data (Step 2), creating a transaction
(Step 3) and then sending this transaction to the gateway
(Step 4). The gateway verifies whether there is a block in the
blockchain associated with the device public key. Otherwise,
the gateway will create a new block for the given device
and update the peer gateways. It is important to clarify that
each device corresponds to one block in the blockchain, to
which all of its transactions are appended in its block ledger.
Once the gateway has a block associated with the device,
it must validate the transaction signature (to ensure that the
information was created by the device), and if the signature
is valid, the transaction is appended to the block (inside the
block ledger) and sent to the peers.
IV. SPEEDYCHAIN FRAMEWORK
This section outlines the architecture of the proposed
SpeedyChain framework. As shown in Figure 1, the involved
entities can be vehicles, RSIs, and SPs such as police sta-
tions, insurance companies, traffic management companies and
digital maps providers like TomTom [26]. Vehicles may use
Block	Header	
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Fig. 2. SpeedyChain data structure definition.
Fig. 3. Device data generation.
V2V or V2I communication [16]. Furthermore, vehicles may
generate data for one of two purposes:
• control data: data that are generated by each vehicle that
can be used by other vehicles or traffic management and
city planners to mitigate congestion in the city, e.g., the
traffic report;
• service data: data that are sent to a particular node, e.g.,
an SP or vehicle owner. These data can be used to offer
personalized services to the vehicle owner, e.g., flexible
insurance, or can be used by the vehicle owner to monitor
particular aspects of the vehicle. The user is responsible
to decide which information will be available to each SP.
In the proposed architecture, the blockchain is managed
by the RSIs and SPs as they have higher resources and
less dynamism compared to vehicles. The vehicle itself is
responsible for gathering data from its sensors, signing them
and generating a new transaction, which is sent to the nearest
RSI. This transaction should be validated by the RSI, as the
RSI has access to the vehicle public key stored in the block
header on the blockchain. A valid transaction is immediately
appended to the current block of that vehicle or a new block
is created if this is a new vehicle and broadcast to the peers
as described in Section IV-B. To ensure vehicle privacy, the
vehicle public key is changed at specific periods of time known
as KUI. As vehicles have limited resources, they only need to
maintain a Merkle tree of the blocks instead of keeping the
whole blockchain (see Section IV-C).
A. Initialization
The proposed architecture works in a permissioned mode,
where only the SP and RSI have rights to manage the
blockchain. While the vehicles are critical entities that generate
data, and the RSI plays a crucial role in managing the
blockchain, we propose to employ specific controls on how
these entities can join and operate the blockchain:
Vehicles: for a vehicle to join the network it first must
prove that it is a genuine vehicle, i.e. it physically exists.
This protects the network against Sybil attacks [27], where
a malicious vehicle pretends to be multiple vehicles and
floods the networks with packets. To achieve this, we use the
location-based trust model as proposed in [28], which consists
of gathering evidence from witnesses to support validation of
the vehicle’s existence1. In our framework, the witnesses are
RSIs and the vehicle’s neighbors at first connection to the
network, which should obtain a location confirmation, from the
unknown vehicle. Figure 4 outlines the main steps required for
a vehicle to join the blockchain. Initially, the vehicle generates
a new public/private pair (Step 1). The vehicle must set an
expiration time for its keys, which is the time period for each
key is considered valid by other participants in the blockchain
1When the RSI does not receive any witness response, the vehicle block
will be kept in a new block pool.
Fig. 4. Smart vehicle presenting to RSI.
(Step 2). The vehicle then populates a genesis transaction
(first transaction in the block ledger) with its public key and
location and sends it to the nearest RSI (Step 4). If there
is no reachable RSI, the vehicle must wait till it is in the
proximity of one. Note that this is a one time process for
joining the blockchain. On receiving the genesis transaction,
the RSI must first verify that the vehicle is genuine. To do
so, the RSI sends a request to other vehicles and RSIs near
the vehicle’s location (which is extracted from the genesis
transaction), asking them whether such a vehicle exists in their
vicinity (Step 5). This confirmation prevents the possibility of
Sybil attacks. Once the RSI receives witness reports from peer
vehicles (Step 6), it proceeds to validation (Step 7). Once the
validation is successful, a new block is created (Step 8) and
broadcast to all RSI peers (Step 9). Thus, the vehicle now is
able to start appending new transactions to the block ledger
in its block.
RSI: it is important that the vehicles or other entities in
the smart city trust the RSIs. For this reason, each new car is
registered to at least one RSI when these vehicles are joining
to the network. After this initial process, the vehicle is able
to move between cities. However, when it enters a new city,
the vehicle may initially have no trust in the RSIs. In our
framework, each city has a unique block header created by
the government (or other authorities). In the blockchain, each
vehicle should keep only one active public key, where its data
are stored. During the authentication phase, the RSI sends its
signature (Step 3.1), which will be validated by the vehicle
and when it is verified (Step 3.1.1), the vehicle asks to join
the blockchain (Step 4), as shown in Figure 4.
B. Operation
The information produced by vehicles is the main asset in
the architecture. Thus, protecting the integrity of the data and
the trust in the data generator, as well as the privacy of the
data generator, are crucial in smart cities, as supported by the
transaction definition in Section III.
Fig. 5. Sensor Data upload by the vehicle.
Figure 5 depicts the typical process whereby a vehicle
uploads sensor data. The vehicle reads data from its sensors
(Step 1), signs these data transactions using its own private
key (Step 1.1) and sends this transaction to the nearest RSI
(Step 2). When there is no RSI nearby, the transaction is sent
to the nearest vehicle and forwarded until an RSI is found. The
RSI then locates the vehicle block in the blockchain using its
PK (Step 2.1). The RSI must then verify the signature in the
transaction (Step 2.1.1). In case of success, the transaction is
appended to the block (Step 2.1.2) and broadcast to all peers
(Step 3).
In addition to the regular operation, there are two other
scenarios that vehicles could face when producing information:
i) unreachable RSI: in this case, the vehicle that is creating a
transaction cannot be reached by other RSIs or vehicles. Thus,
the vehicle will continue storing its data in transactions and
will send those transactions to the RSI when it is connected
again. During this time, its information in the blockchain will
be outdated, until receiving the transactions; and ii) Vehicle-
to-Vehicle communication: in this case, the vehicle can only
communicate with another vehicle. Thus, it will send the
transaction to its neighbor vehicle to be forwarded to the RSI,
as soon one of them reach an RSI. This effectively makes the
nearby vehicle a transaction mule to the nearest RSI.
C. Key Update Interval (KUI)
Each vehicle is authenticated using a Public Key (PK), and,
this PK is available to any entity in the architecture through
the blockchain. This usage is similar to the research presented
in the Bitcoin blockchain [11], where each wallet is identified
by its PK, and, is recommended that the users change this
PK from time-to-time in order to improve its security. In our
architecture, this key is regularly changed to prevent malicious
nodes from identifying the vehicle. To address this challenge,
in our architecture the vehicles can change their PK by storing
a new block header in the blockchain. This implies that all
participants must store an updated view of the blockchain.
However, in a smart city, some entities might have limited
storage capacity, e.g., smart vehicles. To decrease the memory
overhead on these entities, the low resource devices only store
the root hash of a Merkle tree constructed using the PK of
nodes in the network. Each vehicle can change its PK, which
subsequently will change the Merkle tree. Thus, vehicles must
periodically generate the newest Merkle tree. The RSIs are
also responsible for rebuilding the Merkle-tree at the end of a
periodic time interval known as the KUI.
The RSI stores the PK in the new block headers mined
in the blockchain during the KUI. At the end of the KUI,
the RSI constructs a Merkle tree based on the block header.
Then, it broadcasts the calculated value to every node in the
network. By receiving the notification, vehicles update the
root of the Merkle tree. Additionally, each node stores the
necessary information to prove its membership in the Merkle
tree so that it later can prove that its PK is a member of the
Merkle tree and thus authenticate itself.
V. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section we first provide a qualitative discussion on
the security and privacy of our method (Section V-A) followed
by performance evaluation results (Section V-B).
A. Security and privacy analysis
We assume that the adversary (or cooperative adversaries)
can be any node in the SpeedyChain framework. Adversaries
are able to sniff communications, discard transactions, create
false transactions and blocks, change or delete data, analyze
multiple transactions in an attempt to compromise a node,
and sign fake transactions to legitimize colluding nodes. We
assume that standard secure encryption methods are used
between the involved entities, which cannot be compromised
by adversaries.
Security: We define the following possible attack scenarios:
• Sybil: in this attack, the malicious node creates multiple
identities for itself to either flood the network with trans-
actions or create false claims, e.g., false traffic jams. To
perform this attack, the attacker pretends to be multiple
vehicles and uses different identities, i.e., public/private
keys. The proposed architecture is resilient against this
attack as the vehicles authenticate the generator of a
transaction before processing the transaction. Thus, the
attacker will require the public/private keys of multiple
vehicles that exist in the network and cannot fake iden-
tities.
• Modifying the data/transactions: in this attack, the
attacker modifies the content of transactions or the data
that are sent in a transaction. Recall from Section III that
each newly created transaction is signed (in particular
the hash representing the transaction and its content)
by the node creating the transaction before it is sent to
the blockchain and stored on it. Altering the content of
the transaction could be detected by any network peer
by checking its signature, and thus the transaction is
discarded.
• Malicious RSI: A compromised RSI will continue to
receive data from vehicles. However, it is not able to
change any information stored within the transaction,
because the vehicles are responsible for signing the
transactions, and their private key are secure.
Traditional attacks such as Majority, Race, Selfish Mining,
and Block-Withhold [29], exploits the PoW consensus algo-
rithm, and as SpeedyChain does not rely on the PoW, these
attacks were not considered as a threat to the present research.
In the same way, Transaction Malleability attack [29], which
exploits the mechanism on how the Bitcoin transactions are
generated, particularly the transaction id field, does not affect
SpeedyChain.
Privacy: privacy in our proposed architecture, as in the
Bitcoin blockchain, is mainly inherited from the public key
mechanism that identifies each participating entity. However,
in our proposal, the usage of each PK for each entity is limited
by its expiration time, which when reached forces the entity
to regenerate a new key pair.
B. Performance evaluation
In this section we present results in an emulated scenario to
evaluate the performance of our approach. We evaluated the
network using the CORE network emulator [14], running in
a VM in VirtualBox with 4 processors and 8GB of RAM and
the host Intel i7@2.8Ghz and 16GB of RAM. The emulated
network consists of 15 nodes representing RSIs that are inter-
connected with other RSIs and keep the blockchain updated.
Thus, an RSI will be responsible for receiving connection
requests from the vehicles, validating them, creating new
blocks, and broadcasting these blocks to the other RSIs (as
shown in Figure 4). Vehicles are responsible for establishing
a connection to an RSI and, once connected, produce data and
send that to the RSI (as shown in Figure 5).
To evaluate the scalability of the proposed method, we vary
the number of transactions generated by the vehicles, and study
the network performance with 10, 100, and 1,000 transactions
in the network. We also vary the number of participating
vehicles in the network and study the performance in three
scenarios with 50, 100, and 650 vehicles. Overall we run 9
different scenarios to study the performance of each metric,
that allows evaluating the proposed framework performance
to manage transactions and blocks in the smart city scenario
and still keeping this time in a few milliseconds according to
Table I presented in Section II.
We first evaluated the processing time taken by an RSI to
add a new block to the blockchain. The process of adding a
new block includes: i) receiving a connection request at the
RSI, ii) validating the vehicle request, iii) identifying the need
for a new block and creating it, and iv) updating the RSI
peers. Figure 6 summarizes the emulation results. As expected,
the processing time for adding a new block to the blockchain
increases as the number of blocks increases since there are
10,0
12,0
14,0
16,0
18,0
20,0
22,0
50 100 650
M
illi
se
co
nd
s
Number of Blocks
10 - Transactions 100 - Transactions 1000 - Transactions
Fig. 6. Required time in an RSI to add a new block to the blockchain.
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Fig. 7. Required processing time to add new transaction to the blockchain.
more transactions and blocks to be validated by the RSI. It
can also be seen that the number of transactions also directly
affects the processing time (Figure 7). The reason is that a
higher number of transactions in the block ledger requires
longer to validate. However, processing time overhead for
transactions is less significant than for new block creation.
Note that the block creation operation will only be executed
when a vehicle connects to an RSI the first time (or when it
changes its key pair).
The block is created only when a vehicle joins the network.
However, once its block is added to the blockchain, it will
be allowed to generate transactions. The next metric that
we evaluated is the time taken by RSIs to process received
transactions, i.e., verify data signature, check if the block is not
expired, append the transaction and notify all RSIs regarding
the update. Figure 7 plots this metric. In this scenario, it was
noticed that for a blockchain size of 50, the time increases
3.63% when increasing the number of transactions from 10 to
100. In a blockchain with 100 blocks, the transaction creation
time increases 4.62%. However, for a blockchain size of 650
blocks, the time to validate and append a new transactions
increases by 36.97% from 10 to 1,000 transactions, which
points to a linear time increase, as expected. Based on the
collected samples, assuming a confidence level of 95%, the
interval varies from 0.0013 ms to 0.0126 ms, which lead us
to a very small variance on the data.
Each transaction is created by the vehicle and sent to the
RSI. The receiving RSI validates the transaction to ensure
the integrity and trust on the data coming from the vehicle.
Once all validation is performed, the RSI updates its local
blockchain copy and sends it to other RSIs. Each RSI that
receives the new transaction validates the received data before
appending this new transaction to local copy of the blockchain.
The time required to execute this update operation increases as
more transactions are stored in each block, and this behavior
is shown in the tests presented in Figure 8. Considering a
blockchain with 650 blocks and changing the number of
transactions from 10 to 1,000, the time to validate and update
the blockchain increases by 103.08%, which is justified by
having 100 times more transactions to be processed, which
lead us to a linear time grow. Considering a confidence level
of 95% for the samples, the error probability is at 0.003 ms
to 10 transactions and 0.002 ms to 1,000 transactions.
The time that a single peer takes to validate and to update
its blockchain with a new block created for another RSI is
shown in Figure 9. This value varies between 0.021 ms and
0.025 ms for a blockchain with 50 blocks and 10 transactions
to 650 blocks and 1,000 transactions, respectively.
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Fig. 8. Time (ms) to update peer’s blockchain with received transactions
Considering the evaluated blockchain sizes in terms of trans-
actions and amount of blocks, even considering the scenario of
a blockchain with 650 blocks sending 1,000 transactions, the
values are 20.33 ms to validate and to create a new block
and 1.69 ms to create and to validate a new transaction.
The validation time for this scenario represents 7.7% of the
operation total time. It represents a good improvement in
terms of time to add a new transaction in comparison with
the Bitcoin blockchain.
The time taken to calculate the Merkle tree in a vehicle
was measured and is presented in Table II. As this operation
is performed on the transactions, we consider three values for
the number of transactions in the block ledger that are 10, 100
and 1,000, and evaluated the time to generate the Merkle tree
for each set. The time for a block with 10 transactions was
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TABLE II
TIME TAKEN BY VEHICLES TO CALCULATE THE MERKLE TREE ROOT.
# of Transactions Time to calculatethe Merkle tree
10 0.162 ms
100 0.857 ms
1000 7.995 ms
measured as 0.126 milliseconds, while for 1,000 transactions
this time increases to 7.99 milliseconds. As expected, the
time to calculate the Merkle tree increases as there are more
transactions within a block. These results present a sublinear
time increase, and, taking these amount of data, allows to act
as input in order to estimate the KUI used to define the block
expiration time.
VI. CONCLUSION
Future smart vehicles will be increasingly connected and
share information with smart city facilities, e.g., road side
infrastructures, other vehicles, and service providers, to pro-
vide personalized services and to assist the driver for avoiding
congestion, or to alert drivers about a dangerous situation.
However, as the vehicles will exchange privacy-critical data,
the privacy of the vehicle owner must be taken into account
while designing a communication model for vehicles.
This paper proposed SpeedyChain, a new blockchain-based
framework to provide a private and secure communication
model for vehicles. It also ensures data integrity using hashes
in transactions as well as the communication auditability using
transaction records in the blockchain. Using the proposed
framework, the smart city participants, including vehicles and
roadside infrastructures, can trust that the data they received
are generated by a trusted node. We built a two-way trust,
meaning that the vehicle can trust other vehicles or RSIs,
and RSIs can also trust other vehicles. To ensure privacy,
a vehicle can change its key at predefined time-intervals.
Blockchain is used to ensure the identity of the generator
of any incoming transaction. The storage of the blockchain
might not be applicable for low resource participants, e.g.,
smart vehicles, and should be discussed separately. Thus, in
our approach vehicles only maintain the root hash of a Merkle
tree of valid PKs in the network provided by a trust agent
known as Merkle tree updater.
We provided qualitative analysis on security and privacy of
our approach. Simulation results using the CORE simulator
demonstrate that the proposed method is capable of maintain-
ing the blockchain on the RSI and the latency to create blocks
and transactions, as well notify the RSIs about the change,
is low. We also identified that as the number of transactions
generated or blocks created in the blockchain increases, the
time for performing these operations increases too, however,
a further research will be conducted in order to evaluate the
SpeedyChain scalability in a larger scenario.
An interesting direction for future work is to define different
levels of access control for the data that are produced by a
smart vehicle, allowing it to define the access level. Simi-
larly, future work should evaluate a mechanism to allow the
transactions to be stored externally to the blockchain while
maintaining its data sequence, integrity and non-repudiation
attributes.
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